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Abstract 
 
We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a 
fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining 
model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data 
extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/11, we find that the 
number of quality targets is determined by the purchaser's population health and its budget, the 
hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets 
imposed by the supervising regional health authority. 
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1 Introduction
Pay for performance (P4P) schemes to improve quality have been introduced
in many healthcare systems (Emmert et al (2012), Houle et al (2012), Ryan
and Blustein (2012), Scott et al (2011), Werner et al (2013)). There is
considerable variation in the design of these schemes including the number
of quality measures used, their type (structure, process or outcome), the
magnitude of the nancial rewards, and the way they are linked to quality
measures.
In the English National Health Service (NHS) the Commissioning for
Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework requires all local NHS
purchasers to link payments to hospitals to measures of quality. Purchasers
were given considerable autonomy under the CQUIN framework in choos-
ing which aspects of quality to incentivise, which quality indicators to use,
and how they were to be linked to payment. In this paper we examine how
the complexity of local CQUIN P4P schemes - measured by the number of
di¤erent quality targets - varies with the characteristics of hospitals and pur-
chasers, including their size, the type of hospital, their nancial positions,
and the health of purchaser populations. The Department of Health has
increasingly given lower level local decision makers greater contractual dis-
cretion, recognising that local decision makers have better information about
local conditions. Given the limited data we do not attempt to judge whether
local contracts are welfare maximising given local conditions. Instead we in-
vestigate how local decision makers have used their discretion in designing
quality incentive contracts. If variations in quality contracts are associated
with variations in local conditions which might be expected to a¤ect the
welfare benets and costs of more or less complex contracts then this would
provide some evidence on the use of local exibility.
Only two papers have empirically analysed contract choice in healthcare.
Csaba and Fenn (1997) and Chalkley and McVicar (2008) examine how char-
acteristics of local purchasers and hospitals inuence contracts in the English
NHS in the 1990s. They consider how the contracts related payment to the
volume of activity. In this paper, by contrast, we focus on the design of in-
centive contracts for quality. We develop a Nash contract bargaining model
and use it to motivate the empirical analysis. We then test the empirical im-
plications of the model, using a data set of 153 contracts for acute hospitals
in England (about 91% of hospitals) from the second year (2010/11) of the
CQUIN scheme, to determine whether and how the choice of the number of
quality targets is related to hospital and purchaser characteristics. We nd
that the number of locally negotiated quality targets varies with whether the
contract was negotiated by an agency, the purchasers populations health,
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the generosity of its budget relative to need, the type of hospital, and the
quality targets imposed by the purchasers supervising regional authority.
In the next section we explain the contractual arrangements in the NHS
and the characteristics of the CQUIN scheme. Section 3 briey describes
the previous literature on contract choice. Our model of bargaining between
purchaser and hospital is set out in section 4. Section 5 describes our data
sets and methods. and results are reported in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Contractual arrangements in the NHS
2.1 The contracting parties
Since 1991 the National Health Service in England has been organised as
an internal market in which local purchasers negotiate contracts with hos-
pitals. Until 1997, purchasers and hospitals had considerable freedom to
determine the form of the contract. The main structural di¤erence between
the resulting contracts was whether or not payments varied with volume of
treatment (Chalkley and McVicar, 2008). From 2003/04, activity-based -
nancing (called Payment by Results) was introduced nationally and hospitals
were reimbursed on a casemix-adjusted tari¤ determined by the Department
of Health and based on the average costs of procedures across all hospitals
(Street and Maynard, 2007).
At the same time further market-oriented reforms were introduced (De-
partment of Health, 2002): patients were given the right to a wider choice of
hospitals for elective care and the purchasing of healthcare services becom-
ing the responsibility of local purchasers called Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).
Secondary and specialist care hospitals were encouraged to compete to attract
individual patients for elective treatment. The introduction of Foundation
Trust (FT) status was also intended to further stimulate competitive quality
improvement amongst hospitals. Upon meeting certain clinical quality and
nancial standards, hospital trusts could apply to become FTs. As FTs, hos-
pitals become independent, not-for-prot organisations; they could reinvest
their prots in services and could access private capital. Hospitals were over-
seen by two regulators: Monitor for FTs and the Care Quality Commission
which inspected the quality of all hospitals.
Purchasing of NHS healthcare is organised geographically. In 2010/11
there were 151 PCTs, responsible for planning, purchasing and securing
health services for their local population. They received a budget based on a
weighted capitation formula which reected the demographic structure and
need characteristics of their populations (Morris, et al, 2007) and variations
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in input prices (Elliott et al., 2009). PCTs were managed by ten higher-level,
regional Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) which were the link between
the central Department of Health (DH) and the NHS. SHAs were responsi-
ble for implementing national policy, monitoring the performance of the local
purchasers and the hospitals that had not achieved FT status, and managing
the healthcare market.
2.2 NHS Standard Contract and the CQUIN scheme
The annual process of contracting is the focal point of the split between
PCTs and hospitals. An NHS Standard Contract for acute services was
introduced in 2007 to be used for all hospitals providing services to the NHS.
The contracts are legally binding (Petsoulas et al., 2011).
Although there was no evidence that quality was adversely a¤ected by the
introduction of activity based payments to hospitals from 2003/4 (Farrar et
al., 2009), the Department of Health became concerned that hospitals might
reduce quality to keep costs below the tari¤ (Department of Health, 2009).
In 2009 the DH therefore introduced the Commissioning for Quality and
Innovation (CQUIN) framework under which purchasers and hospitals had to
link a proportion of hospital revenue to quality (Department of Health, 2009).
In the rst year, 2009/10 the CQUIN scheme was mandatory for contracts
for acute hospital services and optional for contracts for community, mental
health and ambulance services. In 2009/10, 0.5% of revenue was linked to
quality and many of the CQUIN contracts were concerned with improving
data collection.
From 2010/11, all NHS contracts had to include a CQUIN scheme and
the proportion of the contract value linked to quality improvement increased
to 1.5%. At least 0.3% had to be linked to two nationally mandated quality
indicators,1 and up to 1.2% to other quality indicators. SHAs could require
their PCTs to include specic quality indicators in their contracts with hos-
pitals, so that PCTs could di¤er in the extent to which their negotiations
with hospitals over the quality content of the contract were constrained. In
2010/11 PCTs were instructed not to pay for data collection and were advised
that outcome measures were preferable, though process indicators could be
used if there was a direct link to better outcomes. Within these constraints,
the local elements of the CQUIN scheme were completely exible and de-
termined by negotiations with hospitals. The CQUIN quality targets were
specied as topics (e.g. disease areas such as stroke) and as specic indica-
1The national targets were for risk assessment of admitted patients for venous throm-
boembolism and for patient satisfaction.
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tors within topics (e.g. proportion of stroke patients treated on a dedicated
stroke unit).
Although hospitals typically serve patients from several PCTs, each hos-
pital negotiated with a single purchaser. Usually this was a single PCT
which was designated by the SHA as the negotiating PCT on behalf of the
NHS. Although the content of the CQUIN scheme was negotiated between
the hospital and the lead PCT, achievement of the quality indicators was
measured on the activity undertaken by the hospital for all PCTs which
purchased care from it. In some cases responsibility for negotiating hospital
contracts was passed to an NHS agency which acted on behalf of a cluster of
local PCTs.
Guidance on the NHS Standard Contract set out the expectation that the
PCT and the hospital would co-operate to reach agreement on the CQUIN
scheme with disputes resolved by the SHA. The lead PCT and hospital had
to negotiate a number of aspects of their CQUIN scheme: i) the local topics
(disease areas) to be covered; ii) the indicators to be used to measure perfor-
mance on these local topics; iii) the target levels of quality for the nationally
mandated patient experience2, and for regional and local indicators; and iv)
the proportion of hospital revenue contract to be attached to achievement of
each local indicator. In this paper we focus on the negotiation of the most
salient local aspects of the CQUIN scheme contracts: the number and type
of locally negotiated quality targets.
3 Related literature
Contractual choice has been the focus of a large theoretical and empirical
literature for other sectors, particularly agriculture, procurement and the oil
industry (see, for example, Shaban (1987); Corts and Singh (2004); Shepard
(1993); Joskow (1987); Williamson (1983)). Although there is an exten-
sive normative theoretical literature on the design of contracts in healthcare
(Chalkley and Malcomson, 2000), there have been only two empirical papers
which analyse the factors determining the content of healthcare contracts.
Both exploit the local exibility in contract setting in the rst round of NHS
internal market reforms in 1990-1997.
Csaba and Fenn (1997) analyse the share of total contracted hospital in-
come accounted for by block or cost and volume contracts in which payment
did not vary with the volume of services provided, compared with the share
2The target level of quality for the venous thromboembolism national goal was set
nationally.
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accounted for by cost per case contracts. They argue, drawing on a theoreti-
cal model (Fenn et al, 1994), that with uncertain demand and xed hospital
capacity, purchasers would prefer to earmark more of local hospital capacity
for their patients the more likely the hospital was to nd itself facing excess
demand from patients. They use data on 71 major district acute hospitals,
representing about a third of acute hospitals in England in the nancial year
1992/93.3 They nd that the share of hospital revenue accounted for by con-
tracts with volume dependent payment is increased when the hospital has
more spare capacity (empty bed days) and reduced when the local popula-
tion is more deprived (which they argue implies a greater opportunity cost
to unmet local demand) and the hospital has a bigger share of its revenue
from private patients, which they interpret as a proxy for quality.
Chalkley and McVicar (2008) consider how hospital and purchaser char-
acteristics were related to the choice between block contracts with a lump
sum payment from purchaser to hospital, sophisticated block contracts with
a combination of lump sum and extra-payment if costs fall outside a stated
range, and volume dependent contracts.4. They outline a model of contract
choice by the purchaser which allows for the providers decisions on cost re-
ducing e¤ort, volume, and quality to be a¤ected by the contract. They use
data on 236 contracts from 52 purchasers in 1991/92 and 464 contracts from
106 purchasers in 1993/94. Consistent with the predictions of their theoret-
ical model, they nd that contracts for acute services for which there was a
signicant variation in demand, small variation in costs, and low monitoring
costs were more likely to entail sophisticated block or volume-dependent con-
tracts. Hospitals that were more distant from the purchaser were more likely
to have block contracts, probably because of higher monitoring costs. There
was no signicant e¤ect of the hospitals acquisition of NHS Trust status on
the choice of the contract.
3Amongst hospitals characteristics they consider the mean number of empty bed days
between consultant episodes, the number of people in the hospitals district waiting more
than one year as a proportion of those treated, unit costs and the percentage of total
revenue generated from private patient care. Purchasers characteristics are the per capita
budget and the Jarman underprivileged area score.
4Hospital characteristics included service type (acute/non acute, mental health or com-
munity health, and multiple services), NHS Trust status and whether the hospital is out-
side the Health Authority boundary. The only purchaser characteristic is whether the
purchaser is a GP. Market structure proxies are the number of hospitals of similar services
within 10 miles and number of GP fundholders per 100,000 population.
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4 Bargaining model
We set out a simple bargaining model which captures some of the strate-
gic considerations behind the determination of the number of local hospital
quality targets negotiated between PCTs and hospitals under the CQUIN
scheme.5 The model yields some clear predictions about the e¤ect of certain
factors and is also useful because it explains why apparently intuitively obvi-
ous propositions about the e¤ects of certain PCT or hospital characteristics
may not be valid.
4.1 The model
The PCT receives a budget from the Department of Health which is derived
from a formula which includes measures of the health needs of the PCTs
population. From this budget the PCT must purchase both acute hospital
care and mental health, community, and primary care. Under the CQUIN
scheme a xed percentage of the hospitals revenue must be linked to the
achievement of local and regional quality targets. We focus on the PCT and
the hospital bargain over the number of local quality targets n. We take n
to be continuous and assume that quality targets are always met.6
The objective function of the PCT is
V (n;nS, xHP , αP , y, h) = αPB
HP (n;nS, xHP , y, h)−m(n;nS) (1)
BHP is the welfare of patients of the PCT treated at the hospital and m
is the e¤ort cost of monitoring the targets. αP is a weight measuring the
altruism of the PCT negotiators relative to their e¤ort costs. Patient welfare
is increasing in n and more targets increase monitoring costs. We assume
that V is concave in n. nS is the number of targets imposed by the Strategic
Health Authority. xHP is the volume of treatment provided by the hospital
to the PCTs patients. Patient welfare is increasing in the number of patient
5Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2011) review the healthcare bargaining literature. Barros
and Martinez-Giralt (2008) consider the purchasers choice of the negotiation mechanism
between simultaneous (Nash) bargaining with two di¤erent hospitals and Any Willing
Provider (AWP), where the purchaser o¤ers a contract which hospitals can only accept
or reject. The authors show that AWP is preferred by the payer when the surplus to
be shared is su¢ciently high. Siciliani and Stanciole (2008) consider the choice between
bargaining over the price, over the level of activity, or simultaneous negotiations over price
and activity level. They show that a purchaser will prefer to negotiate on both price and
activity only when she has su¢ciently high bargaining power.
6More generally, but equivalently for model specication purposes, we can assume that
the choice of the number of targets has a predictable monotonic increasing e¤ect on quality
and consequently on patient benet.
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treated and the marginal gain from targets is larger with more patients:
BHP
nxHP
> 0.
h is an index of the underlying pre-treatment health of the PCTs pop-
ulation and BHPh > 0, but healthier patients gain less from more quality
targets (BHPnh < 0). A greater PCT budget relative to the health need of
the population y increases the welfare of hospital patients (BHPy > 0) and
reduces the marginal welfare gains from more hospital targets (BHPny < 0).
SHA and PCT quality targets are partial substitutes. More SHA targets
increase the welfare from treatment (BHPns > 0) but reduce the patient gain
from local targets (BHPnns < 0). PCT monitoring costs m are increasing and
convex in local and SHA targets and the marginal monitoring costs of local
targets increase with the number of SHA targets (mnns > 0).
The hospital objective function
U(n;nS, xH , δ, RH , y, h) = δBH(n;nS, xH , y, h) +RH − C(n;nS, xH , θ) (2)
is also concave in n. xH is the total volume of patients from all PCTs
treated at the hospital. The hospital cares about the welfare of patients
it treats but not which PCT the patients belong to. δ ≥ 0 measures the
hospitals altruism. RH is total revenue for the hospital and C is total cost,
which is increasing and convex in n. θ is a shift parameter which increases
hospital costs and the marginal hospital cost of local targets (Cθ > 0, Cnθ >
0). Increases in total output and in SHA targets increase hospital cost and
increase the marginal cost of local targets (Cz > 0, Cnz > 0, z = x
H , nS).
Since total benet to all patients treated is the sum of benets to patients of
the negotiating PCT and patients from other PCTs, increases in the health
of the negotiating PCTs population health and the generosity of its budget
a¤ect the marginal benets from local targets: BHz = B
HP
z ,B
H
nz = B
HP
nh
(z = h, y).
The PCT and hospital bargain over the number of local targets, taking
all other variables (such as the hospitals output or its total revenue as xed).
We assume that the bargain struck is the Nash bargaining solution (Binmore
et al (1986)) which maximises the weighted product of the utility gains
L = [V (n; )− V o]β[U(n; )− U o](1−β) (3)
where V o and U o are the utilities they would received if there is no agreement.
β ∈ [0, 1] is a bargaining power parameter.
We assume that if there is no agreement, the number of local targets
is zero and the PCT and hospital su¤er an additional utility cost of dis-
agreement, perhaps because of sanctions imposed by the Strategic Health
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Authority. Thus V o = V (0; )− γP , U o = U(0; )− γH where γP , γH are the
additional penalties for failure to agree.
The bargain thus maximises
ℓ = lnL = β ln[V − V o] + (1− β) ln[U − U o]
= β ln

αPB
HP (n; )−m(n; ) − [αPB
HP (0; )−m(0; )− γP ]
	
× (1− β) ln{δBH(n; )− C(n; )− [δBH(0; )− C(0; )− γH ]} (4)
Notice that RH cancels from the utility gain to the hospital. With an interior
solution, the rst order condition is7
ℓn = β
Vn(n; )
V (n; )− V o(0; )
+ (1− β)
Un(n; )
U(n; )− U o(0; )
= 0 (5)
We assume that, even though the hospital is partially altruistic, it would
prefer a smaller number of targets than the PCT because it bears all the cost
of meeting the targets. Hence in (5) Vn > 0 and Un < 0.
4.2 Comparative statics
We consider rst the case in which the PCT has all the bargaining power
(β = 1) and n is chosen so that
Vn = αPB
HP
n (n;n
S, xHP , y, h)−mn(n;n
s) = 0 (6)
Table 1 reports the comparative static responses. The sign of the comparative
static e¤ects of an exogenous factor z on n depends on the sign of Vnz.
An increase in SHA imposed targets (nS) reduces the marginal gain from
local targets and increases marginal monitoring costs and so reduces the
number of local targets. An increase in the generosity of the PCTs budget
relative to need (y) reduces patient gains from additional targets and so the
e¤ect of greater budgets is negative. An increase in population health (h)
reduces the number of targets because of our assumption that the gain from
additional targets is smaller when the population is healthier. The benet
from additional targets is greater when more patients are a¤ected so the
number of targets increases if the volume of treatments of PCT patients at
the provider xHP increases. Increases in PCT altruism (αP ) unsurprisingly
increase the number of local targets.
When the hospital has all the bargaining power (β = 0) n satises
Un = δB
H
n (n;n
S, xH , y, h)− Cn(n;n
S, xH , θ) = 0 (7)
7V and U are concave in n so that lnV and lnU are also concave in n and since, the
sum of concave functions is concave, the rst order condition is also su¢cient.
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and the comparative static predictions are determined by Unz. The qualita-
tive predictions for the e¤ects of the number of SHA targets nS, the generosity
of the PCT budget y, and population health h are the same as when the PCT
sets n. Increases in provider altruism and increases in provider e¢ciency
(reductions in θ) increase the number of targets. The marginal benet from
local targets is greater when the hospital treats more patients since the tar-
gets are set for all patients, but the marginal cost of local targets will be
greater since they will apply to more patients. Thus the e¤ect of the hospital
treating more patients xH is ambiguous.
When neither party has complete bargaining power (β ∈ (0, 1)), the sign
of the e¤ect of an exogenous parameter z on the number of local targets is
determined by the sign of ℓnz. Since the PCT prefers higher n and the
hospital lower n, an increase in PCT bargaining power (β) unsurprisingly
increases the number of targets.
Determining the e¤ect of other parameters is less straightforward than in
the cases where β = 1 or β = 0. Di¤erentiating (5) with respect to z (where
z is any of the parameters entering V − V o or U − U o) gives8
sgn
∂n
∂z
= sgn

Vnz
Vn
−
Vz − V
o
z
V − V o

−

Unz
Un
−
Uz − U
o
z
U − U o

(8)
In the cases where β = 1 or β = 0 the number of targets is determined by
rst order conditions which depend only on rst derivatives of the objective
function of the PCT or hospital. In these models comparative static proper-
ties depend only on second order partial derivatives (Vnz or Unz).
9 But the
Nash bargaining solution with β ∈ (0, 1) maximises the product of objective
functions (or the sum of their logarithms) and so the rst order conditions
involve the products of the level of objective functions and their rst deriv-
atives. Hence the comparative statics properties, which are determined by
the derivative of the rst order condition, depend in an essential way on both
rst and second derivatives of the objective functions and on their levels. The
detailed derivation of the results for this case are in the Appendix.
When γH increases the hospital is worse o¤ if there is no agreement
(U o
γH
< 0) but γH does not a¤ect U . Hence (8) reduces to sgn −U o
γH
/(U −
U o) > 0, and so n increases when the hospitals disagreement utility is re-
duced. The rationale is that at the solution the hospital would prefer fewer
targets and so a weakening of its bargaining position leads it to concede more
8ℓnz = β(V − V
o)−2[Vnz(V − V
o) −Vn(Vz − V
o
z
)] (1 − β)(U − Uo)−2[Unz(U − U
o)
−Un(Uz − U
o
z
)]. Substituting for (1− β) from (5) and rearranging gives (8).
9Taking the logarithm or other increasing monotonic transformation of an objective
function has no e¤ect on the optimal solution and hence no e¤ect on the comparative
statics.
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targets. The e¤ect of an increase in the disagreement utility of the PCT (a
reduction in γP ) is similarly easy to determine since V o
γP
> 0 and VγP = 0.
An increase in hospital altruism δ increases the contribution of BH to L.
Since BH is strictly increasing in n, an increase in δ has a straightforward
positive e¤ect of the number of local targets. θ increases the providers cost
(Cθ > 0) and the marginal cost of local targets ( Cnθ > 0). Consequently an
increase in θ implies a reduction in n.
We have assumed that better population health reduces the marginal
benet of locally negotiated quality, i.e. BHPnh < 0, B
H
nh < 0. In the appendix
we show that with z = h, (8) is
sgn

αPB
HP
nh
Vn
−
αP (B
HP
h (n; )−B
HP
h (0; ))
V − V o

−

δBHnh
Un
−
δ(BHh (n; )−B
H
h (0; ))
U − U o

The assumption that BHPnh < 0, B
H
nh < 0, implies that B
HP
h (n; ) < B
HP
h (0; )
and BHh (n; ) < B
H
h (0; ), so the rst square bracketed term is ambiguously
signed and the second is negative. In the special case where h has no e¤ect on
the disagreement utility of the PCT (V oh = 0), PCTs with better population
health would negotiate solutions with fewer targets. Note also that if the
PCT has greater bargaining power, so that its utility gain V − V o is larger,
it is more likely that increases in h reduce n.
Similar reasoning can be applied when considering the e¤ects of an in-
crease in y. An increase in the PCTs budget relative to health care need
has a negative e¤ect on the marginal benet of locally negotiated quality,
BHPny < 0 and B
H
ny < 0. With z = y, (8) is
sgn
("
αPB
HP
ny
Vn
−
αP (B
HP
y (n; )−B
HP
y (0; ))
V − V o
#
−
"
δBHny
Un
−
δ(BHy (n; )−B
H
y (0; ))
U − U o
#
The second square bracketed term has the opposite sign to BHny. The rst
square bracketed term has ambiguous sign since BHPny has the same sign as
BHPy (n; )−B
HP
y (0; ). The rst square bracketed term is ambiguously signed
and the second is negative. Again, if the PCT has greater bargaining power,
so that its utility gain V − V o is larger, it is more likely that increases in y
reduce n.
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The e¤ect of other parameters, such as the level of PCT altruism, the
exogenous levels of hospital output and regionally dened targets are am-
biguous without much stronger assumptions. It is perhaps surprising that
greater PCT altruism has an ambiguous e¤ect. The explanation is that
although greater altruism increases the PCTs marginal gain from targets
(the numerator in (5)) it also increases the PCTs utility gain (the denomi-
nator in (5)) and so the rst term in the rst order condition may increase
or decrease.
5 Data and methods
5.1 Data sources
Information on 153 CQUIN contracts agreed for acute hospitals in 2010/11
was obtained from the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement web-
site10 (see NHS, 2009). We use the information on the locally negotiated
targets and those mandated by the PCTs Strategic Health Authority and
omit the nationally mandated targets which did not vary across contracts.
Hospital teaching and specialist status was obtained from the Compendium
Indicators of the NHS Information Centre for health and social care.11 The
volume of patients treated at the hospital in 2009/10 and its Reference Cost
Index for 2009/10 were taken from the Department of Health Exposition
Book.12 The Index measures how the hospitals costs compare to national
average costs, adjusted for patient case-mix and input prices.
We use the ratings of quality and nancial competence of hospitals from
the Annual Health Check published by the Care Quality Commission for
2008/09.13 We compare hospitals rated "weak or fair" to those rated "good
or excellent". Information on Foundation Trust status at December 2009 was
obtained from the Monitor website.14
For PCTs we have information from the NHS Institute for Innovation
and Improvement website (see NHS, 2009) on which PCT delegated nego-
10Data contains 91% of all acute hospitals. Details of CQUIN contracts for the other
16 English acute hospital trusts was not available on the website.
11https://indicators.ic.nhs.uk
12http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/en/Managingyourorgani
sation/Financeandplanning/Allocations/DH_091850
13http://archive.cqc.org.uk/_db/_documents/The_annual_health_check_2008_09
_Assessing_and_rating_the_NHS.pdf
14http://www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/about-nhs-foundation-trusts/nhs-foundation-
trust-
directory
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tiation to an agency. We also obtained each PCTs rating in the 2009/10
World Class Commissioning process from the Health Service Journal.15 This
commissioning assurance system involved an annual review by the Strategic
Health Authority of each PCTs progress towards achieving better health
outcomes, competencies and governance. We use the nancial competence
rating, which is measured on a scale from zero to one with one representing
the highest level of nancial competence.
The 2010/11 DH Exposition Book provided the expenditure by the lead
PCT at the hospital with which it negotiated,16 the size of the population
served by the PCT, its disability-free life expectancy (which is used by gov-
ernment to monitor geographical health inequalities), and a measure of the
generosity of the PCTs budget relative to its need. This latter variable (the
distance from target) measures the extent to which the PCTs nancial allo-
cation for 2010/11 di¤ers from the target allocation needed as calculated by
the national resource allocation formula.
5.2 Matching empirical and theoretical variables
Table 2 summarises the parameters in the theoretical model and their corre-
spondent proxies in the empirical model. The free-text nature of the much
of the dataset describing the CQUIN contracts precludes meaningful quan-
titative analysis beyond the number of topics and indicators. We examine
four measures of the number of quality targets (n in the theoretical model).
We use the the number of locally negotiated topics and the number of locally
negotiated indicators, and we also classify the locally negotiated indicators as
either outcome indicators measuring outcome improvement indicators mea-
suring process improvement.
Hospital ine¢ciency (θ) is proxied by the Reference Cost Index. We
also expect that the costs of a hospital will be a¤ected by their teaching or
specialist status, though we are agnostic about the e¤ects of this status on
the cost function. Teaching hospitals undertake more activities than non-
teaching hospitals and may attract better qualied sta¤ but more complex
patients. Specialist hospital undertake a smaller range of activities but
again may attract better qualied sta¤ and patients with conditions requiring
specialised intervention.
Hospital altruism (δ) is captured by the Care Quality Commissions qual-
ity score which reects the level of quality produced by the provider in a pe-
15http://www.hsj.co.uk/topics/world-class-commissioning-scores-2010/world-class-
commissioning-league-table/5018174.article
16If an agency negotiated the contract we take the total expenditure of each individual
PCT for whom it negotiates.
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riod when there were no direct nancial incentives for quality. The volume
of treated patients proxies the parameter xH in the theoretical model.
The generosity of the PCTs budget (y) is represented by its distance
from target at the start of the year and the health of its population (h) by
its disability-free life expectancy. The PCTs altruism (αP ) is captured by
whether or not the PCT passed responsibility for negotiating the contract to
an agency: we assume that agencies are less altruistic than the PCT.
Foundation Trusts arguably attract better managers and are less reliant
on their contracts with PCTs for their income, so we assume that when the
hospital is Foundation Trust, the PCTs bargaining power (β) is smaller.
Conversely, we assume that PCTs with larger populations can attract better
managers and so β is larger for PCTs with larger populations.
We interpret the reservation utilities of the hospital and the PCT (i.e.
V 0 and U0 in the theoretical model) as the reputational consequences of
intervention by the Strategic Health Authority if the parties fail to agree on
the CQUIN contract. For hospitals we use the Care Quality Commissions
rating of the hospitals nancial position as a proxy and assume that V o
is higher when the rating is higher. For PCTs we use the World Class
Commissioning rating as a proxy for how vulnerable the reputation of the
PCT is to failure to reach agreement. PCTs with higher ratings are assumed
to be less vulnerable to bargaining breakdown so that U o is higher.
5.3 Econometric methods
We estimate count data models for each of the four dependent variables.
In the standard Poisson regression model (Maddala, 1986) the number of
quality indicators n has a distribution determined by the conditional mean
(x) ≡ E(n|x)
f(n|x) =
exp[−(x)][(x)n]
n!
n = 0, 1, ..., N
Since the basic assumption of variance-mean equality required by the stan-
dard Poisson model is rejected for all our dependent variables, we consider
two generalisations which make di¤erent assumptions about the variance.
The Poisson GLM variance assumption (Wooldridge, 2001) is
V ar(n|x) = τPE(n|x)
where τP > 0 is the variance-mean ratio or over dispersion parameter. Over-
dispersion occurs whenever τP > 1 as is the case in our data. The negative
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binomial distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) is a popular alternative
to the Poisson in case of over-dispersion and has variance:
V ar(n|x) = E(n|x) + τNB[E(n|x]
2
with τNB ≥ 0.
In both the Poisson GLM and negative binomial models the conditional
mean number of quality targets is specied as (x) = exp(βx). We report
the estimated e¤ect of an explanatory variable xk as an incident rate ratio
(IRR), rather than as a coe¢cient βk. Letting Ik = (0, .., 1, ...0) denote a
vector with 1 in the kth positition and 0 elsewhere, the incident rate ratio
is the proportionate change in the mean number of quality targets due to a
one unit increase in xk
(x+ Ik)
(x)
=
exp(β(x+ Ik)
exp(βx)
= exp(βk)
We estimate both generalised Poisson and negative binomial models for
all the measures of n and graphically compare the distribution of the variables
with the Poisson and negative binomial distributions to choose the preferred
specication. We report two models for each measure of n. The rst has
the full set of explanatories. For the second we sequentially delete the least
signicant variable until we have a parsimonious model containing only vari-
ables statistically signicant at p < 0.05. In the models for the numbers
of outcome and process quality indicators, we retained variables that were
signicant for at least one of these dependent variables.
6 Results
6.1 Descriptive statistics
The CQUIN schemes varied widely in the type of care targeted and the ways
in which performance was measured. The local CQUIN schemes in our data
set between them covered 92 disease areas (topics) and included 1,546 distinct
indicators.
Table 3 shows that on average there are three regionally mandated topics
and outcome/process indicators in each contract. The locally negotiated
elements of the contracts contain, on average, ve topics or clinical areas
and eight indicators. On average, locally negotiated contracts contain more
process than outcome indicators. This is not surprising as outcome indicators
are riskier for the hospital and more costly to monitor for the PCT. Some
contracts did not contain any locally negotiated quality targets. Eighteen
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contracts had no locally negotiated topics or indicators, 53 had no outcome
indicators, and 33 had no process indicators.
About 15% of contract negotiations were led by an agency representing
the PCT. 15% of hospitals were teaching hospitals, 12% had specialist status,
and 53% were Foundation Trusts.
6.2 Regression results
Results for the Poisson GLM and negative binomial indicators were very
similar for all four measures of n. Graphical inspection suggested that the
GLM Poisson was a better specication than the negative binomial for the
number of locally negotiated topics and the number of indicators and that
the negative binomial was better for the number of outcome indicators and
the number of process indicators.17
Table 4 displays the results for the number of locally negotiated topics
and indicators. The number of indicators mandated by the Strategic Health
Authority does not inuence the amount of local content. Contracts with
Teaching Trusts have numbers of locally negotiated topics and indicators
that are respectively 1.35 and 1.51 times greater than other Trusts. Specialist
Trusts have contracts with 1.45 times as many indicators as other Trusts.
PCTs with a more generous budget relative to their need and PCTs with
better population health negotiate fewer topics and indicators.
Table 5 has the results for the numbers of locally negotiated outcome
and process indicators. Contracts in regions with more SHA-mandated out-
come indicators negotiated local contracts containing more outcome indica-
tors. Teaching Trusts have more process indicators included in their contract
while Specialist Trust contracts have more outcome indicators. When PCTs
have more generous budgets relative to their need and have better popula-
tion health the contracts contain fewer outcome indicators and fewer process
indicators. The number of outcome indicators is a little more sensitive to
the PCTs budget and health level. When the contract is negotiated by an
agency it has substantially fewer process indicators.
7 Discussion
Table 6 provides a qualitative summary of the regression results. The number
of indicators mandated by the supervising Strategic Health Authority does
not a¤ect either the number of disease topics targeted or the total number of
17Results for the models not reported and the distribution graphs are available from the
authors.
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indicators. However, an increase in the number of SHA mandated outcome
indicators does increase the number of locally mandated outcome indicators.
This may indicate that there are economies of e¤ort in monitoring outcome
indicators: once the PCT has made the investment necessary to monitor the
SHA mandated outcome indicators it becomes easier to monitor additional
outcome indicators.
Contracts with Teaching Trusts and Specialist Trusts had more quality
targets. This may be because of the e¤ect of Teaching Trust and Specialist
Trust on the marginal cost of additional quality targets. Since the altruism
parameter in our theory model measures the rate at which the hospital is
willing to trade o¤ patient benet and cost, we could equivalently regard
Teaching Trust and Specialist Trust status as indicating greater altruistic
concern for patient benets. In the case of Teaching Trusts this could reect
the type of sta¤ attracted to them. For Specialist Trusts, the benets from
better quality are concentrated on more specic types of patients so that
sta¤ nd it easier to empathise with them.
We explain the consistently negative e¤ects of better PCT population
health and the generosity of its budget relative to need by the plausible
assumption that when the PCT population is healthier or better resourced
the marginal gain from quality improvement is smaller. The explanation for
contracts negotiated by agencies having fewer quality targets may be because
agencies which negotiate on behalf of a cluster of PCTs will place a lower
weight on the patient benets because they have less direct responsibility for
patients wellbeing.
The objectives of public purchasers and hospitals and the extent to which
they reect the interests of their local populations are unclear. Despite this,
delegating discretion to over 150 local purchasers and hospitals produced
contracts in which the number of quality targets was systematically related
to features of the organisations and their populations. The contracts are,
in other words, not entirely driven by unobservable local idiosyncracies. We
cannot test whether the number of quality targets was welfare maximising for
any given population, but it is somewhat encouraging that the variation in
the number of quality targets in contracts negotiated on their behalf appears
to be at least partly explained by the health of local populations and their
funding relative to need.
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Appendix
Derivation of comparative static results
With z = δ, the sign of ∂n/∂z (8) is
sgn

−

BHn (n; )
Un
−
BH(n; )−BH(0; )
U − U o

> 0
since that Un < 0 and B
H
n > 0.
With z = αP , (8) is
sgn

BHPn
Vn
−
BHP (n; )−BHP (0; )
V − V o

and since BHPn > 0 implies that B
HP (n; )− BHP (0; ) > 0, the e¤ect of the
altruism parameter αP is ambigous.
With z = θ, (8) is
sgn

−

−Cnθ
Un
+
Cθ(n; )− Cθ(0; )
U − U o

< 0
where the sign follows since Cθn > 0 implies Cθ(n; ) > Cθ(0; ).
With z = h, (8) is
sgn

αPB
HP
nh
Vn
−
αP (B
HP
h (n; )−B
HP
h (0; ))
V − V o

−

δBHnh
Un
−
δ(BHh (n; )−B
H
h (0; ))
U − U o

The assumption that BHPnh < 0,B
H
nh < 0, implies that B
HP
h (n; ) < B
HP
h (0; )
and BHh (n; ) < B
H
h (0; ), so the rst square bracketed term is ambiguously
signed and the second is negative.
With z = y, (8) is
sgn
("
αPB
HP
ny
Vn
−
αP (B
HP
y (n; )−B
HP
y (0; ))
V − V o
#
−
"
δBHny
Un
−
δ(BHy (n; )−B
H
y (0; ))
U − U o
#)
The second square bracketed term has the opposite sign to BHny. The rst
square bracketed term has ambiguous sign since BHPny has the same sign as
BHPy (n; )−B
HP
y (0; ).
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With z = xH , (8) is
sgn

αOB
HO
nxH
Vn
−
αO(B
HO
xH
(n; )−BHO
xH
(0; ))
V − V o

−
"
δBH
nxH
− c
nxH
Un
−
δ(BHy (n; )−B
H
y (0; ))−
 
c
xH
(n; )− c
xH
(0; )

U − U o
#)
The rst square bracketed term has ambiguous sign since BHO
nxH
has the same
sign as BHO
xH
(n; )− BHO
xH
(0; ). The sign of the second square braketed term
depends of the magnitude of the e¤ect of an increase in xH on the marginal
benet of local quality BH and the cost function c.
With z = xHP , (8) is
sgn

αPB
HP
nxHP
− αOB
HO
nxHP
Vn

−
" 
αPB
HP
xHP
(n; )− αOB
HO
xHP
(n; )

−
 
αPB
HP
xHP
(0; )− αOB
HO
xHP
(0; )

V − V o
#)
The sign is ambiguous and it depends on the sign and magnitude of BHP
nxHP
and BHO
nxHP
.
With z = nS, (8) is
sgn

αPB
HP
nnS
+ αOB
HO
nnS
−m
nnS
Vn

−

αP (B
HP
nS
(n; )−BHP
nS
(0; )) + αO(B
HO
nS
(n; )−BHO
nS
(0; ))
V − V o

−

m
nS
(n; )−m
nS
(0; )
V − V o

−
"
δBH
nnS
− c
nnS
Un
−
δ(BH
nS
(n; )−BH
nS
(0; ))−
 
c
nS
(n; )− c
nS
(0; )

U − U o
#
The rst square bracketed term is negative given the assumption that n and
nS are substitutes. But this assumption also implies that the second square
bracketed term is negative. Similarly the rst and second components of
the third square bracketed term are also negatively and so the third square
bracketed term has an ambiguous sign. If the PCT has high bargaining
power, so that V − V o is very large, then an increase in regional quality nS
would have a negative e¤ect on n.
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Table 1. Comparative statics: effect of exogenous factors on number of locally negotiated quality targets 
 Solution type 
Exogenous variable E = 1 E = 0 E  (0,1) 
Regional targets nS   ? 
Hospital inefficiency T 0   
Hospital altruism G 0 + + 
Hospital output xH 0 sgn H HHnx nxB c  ? 
Hospital reservation utility Uo na na  
PCT bargaining power E na na + 
PCT budget generosity y   ? 
PCT population health h   ? 
PCT patients treated at hospital xHP + 0 ? 
PCT altruism DP + 0 ? 
PCT reservation utility V0 na na + 
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Table 2.  Variables in theoretical and empirical models 
Variables in bargaining model  Proxies in empirical model 
Number of locally negotiated targets n Locally negotiated topics; 
Locally negotiated indicators; 
Locally negotiated, outcome indicators; 
Locally negotiated process indicators; 
Regional targets nS SHA imposed topics; 
SHA imposed outcome indicators; 
SHA imposed process indicators; 
Hospital inefficiency T Reference Cost Index; 
Teaching hospital (positively or negative related); 
Specialist Trust (positively or negatively related); 
Hospital altruism G CQC quality score 2009/10 
Hospital output xH Volume of treated patients 2009/10 
Hospital reservation  utility Uo CQC financial rating 
PCT bargaining power E +RVSLWDO¶V)RXQGDWLRQ7UXVWVWDWXVQHJDWLYHO\UHODWHG 
PCT population  
PCT budget generosity y Distance from target (budget minus target budget) 
PCT population health h Disability free life expectancy 
PCT patients treated at hospital xHP 3&7¶VH[SHQGLWXUHDWKRVSLWDO 
PCT altruism DP Contract negotiation not delegated to agency 
PCT reservation utility Vo World Class Commissioning financial competency score 
Note: proxies are positively related to the bargaining model variable except where stated. 
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Table 3.  Summary statistics 
 
 Mean SD. Min. Max. 
Number of locally negotiated quality targets:     
Topics 5.46 3.89 0.00 18.00 
Indicators 8.61 8.29 0.00 50.00 
Outcome  indicators 2.75 4.25 0.00 24.00 
Process indicators 5.42 5.74 0.00 27.00 
Number Regional mandated quality targets:     
Topics 3.73 3.13 0.00 13.00 
Outcome  indicators 2.87 3.27 0.00 18.00 
Process indicators 2.31 3.83 0.00 15.00 
Hospital characteristics     
Reference Cost Index 2009/10 100.77 9.05 80.00 157.00 
Teaching  Trust 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Specialist  Trust 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
CQC quality  score (2008/09) 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Patients treated (2009/10, 10,000s) 0.98 0.54 0.00 2.79 
CQC finance score (2008/09) 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Foundation Trust by 2009 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
PCT characteristics     
Population size (2009/10, 100,000s) 5.67 4.35 1.42 19.10 
Generosity of budget relative to need (2010) 0.49 5.52 -7.40 21.30 
Population health  (2010) 62.71 3.10 55.80 68.10 
Expenditure at hospital (£100Ms; 2009/10) 3.12 1.99 0.00 10.58 
Contract negotiated by an agency  0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
WCC financial competency  rating  (2009/10) 0.71 0.21 0.00 1.00 
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Table 4.  Models for number of local topics and local indicators 
 Local topics Local indicators 
 Full Model Parsimonious 
Model 
Full Model Parsimonious 
Model 
 IRR z IRR z IRR z IRR z 
Regional contenti  1.00 0.03   0.99 -0.70   
Hospital characteristics:          
Reference cost index  1.01 1.34   0.99 -0.20   
Hospital is a Teaching Trust  1.35*  1.80 1.35**        2.20 1.45*          1.91 1.51**       2.45 
Hospital is a Specialist Trust  0.85 -0.65   1.60*          1.79 1.45*        1.93 
CQC quality rating 2008/9 0.87 -1.06   0.81 -1.25   
Patients treated 2009/10  0.93 -0.47   1.01 0.05   
CQC financial rating 2008/9 1.08 0.41   1.23 0.97   
Hospital is a Foundation Trust 0.90 -0.79   0.84 -1.11   
PCT characteristics:         
3&7¶VSRSXODWLRQVL]H 0.99 -0.13   1.01 0.29   
3&7¶VJHQHURVLW\RIEXGJHW 0.97** -2.24 0.97**        -2.92 0.97***      -1.44 0.96**       -2.48 
3&7¶VSRSXODWLRQKHDOWK 0.94*** -2.84 0.93***      -4.15 0.91***      -3.79 0.90***     -4.99 
3&7¶VH[SHQGLWXUHDWWKLVKRVSLWDO 1.00 0.11   1.05 0.85   
Contract negotiated by agency 0.87 -0.44   0.74 -0.76   
WCC financial competency  
2009/10  
1.13 0.40   1.86            1.55   
Constant 112*** 2.68 376***  5.74 2356***     3.86 4386***  6.54 
Akaike Information Criterion 5.62  5.54  8.25  8.40  
 
N =153 all models. Generalised Poisson models. z stats are scaled using standard errors corrected for over 
dispersion using square root of Pearson F2 dispersion.   i Number of regional topics in the models for topics; 
number of regional indicators in the models for indicators.    
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Table 5.  Models for number of locally negotiated outcome and process indicators 
 Outcome indicators Process indicators 
 Full Model Parsimonious 
Model 
Full Model Parsimonious 
Model 
 IRR z IRR z IRR z IRR z 
Regional content:         
Regional contenti  1.10*** 2.71 1.12*** 3.61 1.03 0.82 1.03 1.00 
Hospital characteristics:          
Reference cost index  1.00 0.25   1.01 0.44   
Hospital  is a Teaching  Trust  0.82 -0.54 0.76 -0.88 1.51 1.48 1.66** 2.19 
Hospital  is a Specialist Trust  2.57** 2.10 2.17** 2.18 0.99 -0.02 1.05 0.18 
CQC quality rating 2008/9 0.90 -0.42   0.72* -1.65   
Patients treated 2009/10  0.63 -1.35   1.18 0.68   
CQC financial rating 2008/9 0.98 -0.05   1.06 0.22   
Hospital is a Foundation Trust 0.78 -1.02   0.92 -0.43   
PCT characteristics:         
3&7¶VSRSXODWLRQVL]H 0.94 -1.17   1.05 1.25   
3&7¶VJHQHURVLW\RIEXGJHW 0.93** -2.37 0.94** -2.16 0.97 -1.48 0.97 -1.58 
3&7¶VSRSXODWLRQKHDOWK 0.89*** -2.77 0.89*** -2.94 0.95* -1.65 0.95* -1.70 
3&7¶VH[SHQGLWXUHDWWKLVKRVSLWDO 1.15 1.47   0.97 -0.49   
Contract negotiated by an agency  1.99 1.23 1.34 0.83 0.28*** -2.71 0.45*** -2.70 
WCC financial competency 2009/10 0.86 -0.25 1.08 0.15 2.99** 2.13 2.61* 1.92 
Constant 3551** 2.46 2337*** 2.84 38.35 1.38 57.28* 1.91 
F2 over dispersion test  41.89  36.80  44.73  40.20  
F2  p value  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  
N = 153. Negative binomial regressions.  ***p < 0:01; **p < 0:05; *p < 0:1.   i No.  of regional outcome  
indicators in models for local outcome indicators and regional process indicators in models for local process 
indicators 
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Table 6: Summary: statistically significant explanatory factors in models of number of 
locally negotiated indicators  
 N local 
topics 
N local 
indicators 
N local outcome 
indicators 
N local process 
indicators 
Regional content    +  
Hospital characteristics:      
Reference cost index      
Hospital is a Teaching  Trust  + +  + 
Hospital is a Specialist Trust   + +  
CQC quality rating 2008/9     
Patients treated 2009/10      
CQC financial rating 2008/9     
Hospital is a Foundation Trust     
PCT characteristics:     
3&7¶VSRSXODWLRQVL]H     
3&7¶VJHQHURVLW\RIEXGJHW     
3&7¶VSRSXODWLRQKHDOWK     
3&7¶VH[SHQGLWXUHDWWKLVKRVSLWDO     
Contract negotiated by agency     
WCC financial competency 2009/10     + 
 
